
Epistemology of the “Six Causes” (六因) in Medieval Chinese Buddhist Logic Based on Kuiji’s Commentary

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Abstract

This is a study of the concept of the “six causes” developed from the Indian Buddhist tradition of Logic and later elaborated by the Chinese Buddhist scholar monks in the Tang dynasty. This study focuses in particular on Kuiji’s elaboration of the “six causes” found in his *Great Commentary* (因明大疏), a commentary to Xuanzang’s translation of Śāṅkarasvāmin’s *Nyāyapraveśa* (因明入正理論). In addition to introducing these understudied “six causes”, this study attempts to call for a reconsideration of the view that epistemology was overlooked in Chinese Buddhist scholarly works in general and in the Medieval Chinese Buddhist logical studies in particular. In this study, I hope to show that Kuiji’s elaboration of the “six causes” exhibits a sophisticated etymology that illustrates how linguistic and spiritual knowledge are complimentary for spiritual cultivation and intellectual learning.

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Keywords

Buddhist logic, Kuiji, Pramāṇasamuccaya, Nyāyamukha, epistemology

Introduction

In principle, the inception of Buddhist logic in the history of Chinese Buddhism began with Xuanzang's (602-664) introduction and translation of two treatises: the *Nyāyapraveśa* (因明入正理論) composed by Śāṅkarasvāmin and the *Nyāyamukha* (因明正理門論) by Dignāga. Scholars have noted that Xuanzang did not translate a more advanced work of Dignāga, the *Pramāṇasamuccaya* (集量論), which Xuanzang had studied and mentioned in his biography.¹ Based on this fact, Stcherbatsky conjectured that the reason why Xuanzang left out the more accomplished work of Dignāga, the *Pramāṇasamuccaya*, and translated only two elementary works of Buddhist logic, was that “he (Xuanzang) himself was much more interested in the religious side of Buddhism and felt only a moderate interest in logical and epistemological enquiries.”² While the upsurge in the study of Buddhist logic during that period is evidenced by the sheer numbers of indigenous commentaries on Buddhist logic,³ the epistemology aspect of Dignāga's logic remained absent from the medieval history of Chinese Buddhism.⁴ In this paper, I would like to show that, despite the absence of the *Pramāṇasamuccaya*, the medieval Chinese Buddhists, Xuanzang's students in particular,

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¹ 大唐慈恩三藏法師傳, T50, no. 2053, p. 241b10-11.

² F. I. Stcherbatskoï, *Buddhist logic. Bibliotheca Buddhica* 26, Osnabrück: Biblio Verlag, 1970, p. 54.

³ Shen (沈劍英) has listed 38 known titles of Chinese commentaries on Buddhist logic or *yinming* 因明, before mid-eight century, see Shen, Jianying 沈劍英, *Dunhuang yin ming wen xian yan jiu* 敦煌因明文獻研究, First Edition. Shanghai: Shanghai gu ji chu ban she 上海古籍出版社, 2008, pp.3-6. For a more detailed research on the introduction and study of Buddhist logic in 7-8th centuries, see Weijen Teng, “Recontextualization, Exegesis, and Logic: Kuiji's (632-682) Methodological Restructuring of Chinese Buddhism,” Ph.D. diss., Harvard University, 2011, pp.127-134.

⁴ The *Pramāṇasamuccaya* was later brought back and translated by Yijing but his translation did not survive.

developed an interesting theory of epistemology associated with Dignāga's Buddhist logic, that is, the "six causes" 六因. This paper is a study of the epistemology of the "six causes" and the purpose of the paper is to show the value of the exegetical apparatus in Chinese Buddhist commentaries, which is still very much understudied.

The Six Causes

The six causes is an elaboration of the two causes mentioned in Dignāga's *Nyāyamukha*, namely 1) generative cause 生因 (Skt. *upapattihetu*)⁵ and 2) illuminating cause 證了因 (Skt. *jñāpakahetu*).⁶ Shentai 神泰⁷ in his commentary on the *Nyāyamukha*, initially commented that there are three types of the illuminating causes, namely illuminating cause by *artha* 義因, by speech 言因, and by intellect 智因.⁸ Later Wengui 文軌 divided the generating causes in the same way, that is, generative cause by *artha* 義生因, by speech 言

⁵ The Sanskrit term for 生因 provided by Katsura is his Japanese translation and study of the *Nyāyamukha is utpādakahetu or kāranahetu*. (Shoryu Katsura 桂紹隆, "Immyō shōri mon ron kenkyū I" 因明正理門論研究一. *Hiroshima Daigaku Bungakubu kiyō* 広島大学文学部紀要 37, 1977, pp. 106-126.) Tucci gave *utpatti* (Giuseppe Tucci, *The Nyayamukha of Dignaga the Oldest Buddhist Text on Logic, After Chinese and Tibetan Materials*, Leipzig: Kommission Bei O. Harrassowitz, 1930, p. 388). But I follow the Sanskrit term *upapatti* in the *Abhidharmakośa* where this generative cause is exemplified by the generation of a sprout caused by seed. "kā punar upapattiḥ ... bījaṃ śālivādejātiprakārabhedenānkuropapadanasya hetuḥ." (Prahallad Pradhan, *Abhidharmakośabhāṣyam*, Vol. 8, *Tibetan Sanskrit Works Series*, Pātaliputram: Kāśīprasadaġayasavāla-Anuśīlan-Samsthānam, 1967, p. 333). The very same example is used by Kuiji to refer the generative cause. "如種生芽，能起用故名為生因". T44, no. 1840, p. 101c1.

⁶ Katsura, "Immyō shōri mon ron kenkyū (I)," p.123.

⁷ Shentai's dates of birth and death are unknown. Hed is one of Xuanzang's earlier disciples. He also wrote a commentary to the *Abhidharmakośa*.

⁸ 《理門論述記》：「初言因者，有其二種：一者生因，二者了因，今此所辨正說了因，兼辨生因。就了因中復有三種：一者義因，謂通是宗法，所作性義。二者言因，立論云者，所作性言。三者智因，諸敵論之者，及證義人。」 T44, no. 1839, p. 77a7-12.

生因, and by intellect 智生因.⁹ Kuiji's exposition of the "six causes" can be regarded as an elaboration on Wengui's. The causal relation amidst the "six causes" constitutes a basic epistemological principle of Buddhist logic, that is, the process and mechanism for the arising of a new knowledge in the opponent whom the proponent wishes to convince. Simply put, for the opponent to realize the proponent's doctrinal argument, the opponent must already have the awareness of the main reasoning in the argument, which both parties agree upon. We will see shortly why this is so. Let me first explain the two causes mentioned by Dignāga and show how they are relevant to the operation of inferential reasoning as a means of establishing one's own doctrinal proposition in the opponent's awareness. I will then show Kuiji's analysis of the "six causes" 六因 and how they are relevant to inferential reasoning (or *Buddhist logic*) for doctrinal argumentation.

The *Nyāyamukha* points out that the inferential reason is a particular cause for the opponent to assent to the proposition in question. This cause is not a generative cause because it does not generate a desired awareness in the opponent. Instead, it is an illuminating cause, which illuminates an awareness, to which the opponent must already assent.¹⁰ Let me illustrate this point with the example of inferential reasoning:

Proposition: Sound is impermanent

Reason: Because it is produced

Example: Just like a pot

What is required here, in order for the inferential reasoning to work, is the awareness "whatever is produced is impermanent", to which the

⁹ 《因明入正理論疏》：「生因有三：一言生因，謂立論者以立因言，能生敵論決定之解故，故是生因。故此論云：由宗因喻多言，開示諸有問者未了義，故二智生因，即立論者發言之智生因因，故名為生因，又遠生他解亦名生因，三義生因，即立論者言所詮義生因詮，故名為生因。」X53, no. 848, p. 683b14-19.

¹⁰ 《因明正理門論本》卷 1：「何以故？今此唯依證了因故，但由智力了所說義。」T32, no. 1628, p. 1b12-13.

opponent must already assent. This awareness, which cannot be generated by the proponent, is the key for the opponent to eventually realize the proposition that “sound is therefore impermanent,” provided that the opponent agrees to the statement that sound “is produced”, which is known as the 宗之法 (Skt. *pakṣadharmatva*), that is, the property that even the opponent must assent to occur in the site of the inference.

The relevant point here is that in order to have any successful doctrinal argument, there has to be some common intellectual ground, such as the awareness of the opponent that “whatever is produced it is impermanent” in the example just given. Without such common ground, a systematic doctrinal argument cannot be processed and cannot yield any new knowledge, and consequently the doctrinal argument would become a matter of “believe-or-not-believe”, instead of a “true-or-false” argument to be assented or denied. Elsewhere I have tried to prove that Kuiji had a general concern with the lack of a common knowledge to process an effective argument of reasoning. He regarded unsystematic and subjective doctrinal arguments as one of the problems in the Chinese Buddhist handling of doctrinal diversity.¹¹ Through the study of Kuiji’s analysis of the “six causes” that I am taking up in this article, I hope that we will come to appreciate the epistemological significance of Kuiji elaboration on the “six causes” as a basis for avoiding unsystematic and subjective approaches to doctrinal arguments in the course of transmission of Buddhism in China.

Kuiji gave a detailed epistemological explanation of the nature of

¹¹ Regarding the problem of Chinese understanding and interpretation of Buddhism, Kuiji in his *Garden of Dharma and Forest of Meaning in the Mahāyāna* pointed out: “Interpretations (of Buddhist teaching) as diverse as these (earlier ones) caused confusions and disputes among the Buddhist masters. This is due to the lack of a(n) [exegetical] standard. The students of later generations were even more confused and had no way to decide which to accept and which to reject.”

《大乘法苑義林章》：「如是種種解釋不同，竝率己情未為典據，所以諸師紛亂互起異端，令後學徒無可從受。」T45, no. 1861, p. 254c20-22.

causal operation in the context of inferential reasoning. The cause (*yin* 因 Skt. *hetu*) is of two kinds with respect to its functions, namely generative cause (*shengyin* 生因) and illuminating cause (*liaoyin* 了因). The function of the generative cause is compared to that of a seed that gives rise to a sprout, while the function of the illuminating cause is compared to that of a lamp that illuminates things so they are made known.¹² Each type of cause can be subcategorized into three sub-types according to their respective instruments, namely speech or words (*yan* 言), awareness (*zhi* 智), and the message or logical meaning expressed by words and the actual objects to which the words refer (*yi* 義 Skt. *artha*). Kuiji gave a detailed explanation of these two pairs of threefold cause.”¹³

1. *Yan shengyin* 言生因 is a generative cause by means of words. By “words,” Kuiji referred to the inferential subject or the proposition (*zong* 宗 Skt. *pakṣa*), the inferential reason (*yin* 因 Skt. *hetu*), and examples (*yu* 喻 Skt. *dr̥ṣṭānta*), which together make up the cause for generating in the opponent the final realization of the proposition.¹⁴

2. *Zhi shengyin* 智生因 is the generative cause by means of

¹² The Chinese word *liao* 了 is conventionally understood to mean “understanding” as *liaojie* 了解 or *mingliao* 明了. However, the following explanation of the *liaoyin* shows that the word *liao* here should be understood to mean “making known” (Skt. *jñāpaka*), hence in this paper I translate the word “liao” as “illuminating”.

¹³ Harbsmeier gave a brief paraphrase of these “six causes” as treated by Kuiji. However, by understanding these “six causes” as reasons, he missed the sense of causality in them, which Kuiji tried to show. Secondly he missed the causal relations between the “six causes” (Harbsmeier Christoph, *Science and civilisation in China: Language and Logic*. Edited by J. Needham, L. Wang, R. D. S. Yates and T.H. Tsien. Vol. VIII, Cambridge [Eng.]: University Press, 1998, p. 383). Tucci, by contrast, gave a much more detailed and useful paraphrasing, but he still did not tease out fully the causal relations between them and how exactly these “six causes” work as a whole, which is what I have set out to do here. (Tucci, *The Nyayamukha of Dignaga the Oldest Buddhist Text on Logic, After Chinese and Tibetan Materials*, pp. 388-389).

¹⁴ 《因明大疏》：「言生因者謂：立論者立因等言，能生敵論決定解故，名曰生因……此中宗等多言名為能立，由此多言，開示諸有問者未了義故。」T44, no. 1840, p. 101c4-7.

awareness. Such an awareness is the cause for generating the inferential reasoning in words used by the proponent just mentioned above, that is, the proposition etc. Subsequently, this is the cause for the “generative cause by speech”¹⁵.

3. The *yi shengyin* 義生因 is the generative cause by means of *yi* 義 (Skt. *artha*), which refers to both the logical meaning of the speech (*daoli yi* 道理義) as well as the objects 境 (Skt. *viṣaya*) of the inferential reasoning. The *yi*, the “message” embedded in the words of the argument and the *yi*, the “objects” referred to by the words, e.g., sound and pot, etc. of the argument, are the causes for generating in the mind of the opponents the awareness enabling the opponent to realize the proposition 根本立義擬生他解.¹⁶ But insofar as the meaning and the objects are the generating cause of the awareness of the opponent, speech is required to communicate them to the opponent.¹⁷
4. *Zhi liaoyin* 智了因 is the illuminating cause by means of awareness. In this context, *Kuiji* refers to the awareness of the opponent. The opponent’s awareness is the cause for their understanding of the [inferential argument] conveyed by the words of the proofs 能立 (Skt. *sādhana*) and the proposition.¹⁸ The cause is understood as an illuminating cause as opposed to a generative cause, because it does not bring about anything new. Instead, it reveals to the opponent the logic of the inferential reasoning demonstrated by the proponent. This opponent’s awareness that the proponent wishes to reveal by

¹⁵ 《因明大疏》：「智生因者，謂立論者發言之智。正生他解實在多言，智能起言，言生因因，故名生因。」T44, no. 1840, p. 101c5-7.

¹⁶ 《因明大疏》：「義生因者，義有二種：一道理名義，二境界名義。道理義者，謂立論者言所詮義，生因詮故名為生因。境界義者，為境能生敵證者智，亦名生因。」T44, no. 1840, p. 101c9-12.

¹⁷ 《因明大疏》：「他智解起本籍言生。」T44, no. 1840, p. 101c12-13.

¹⁸ 《因明大疏》：「智了因者，謂證敵者解，能立言、了宗之智。」T44, no. 1840, p. 101c14-15.

way of a “reminder” is known as “established” knowledge (*jicheng* 極成 Skt. *prasiddha*).¹⁹

Kuiji also explained that this “awareness” cannot work alone as an illuminating cause. The words of the argument, which are to be explained in the following, are the “reminder”²⁰ that recalls the awareness of the opponent.²¹

5. *Yan liaoyin* 言了因 is the illuminating cause by means of words, which refers to the speech of the proofs.²² This speech then reveals to the opponents what is exactly to be proved 所立 (Skt. *sādhya*).²³ Kuiji concluded that this is the “illumination cause by awareness,” because it is the words that remind the audience of the awareness.²⁴

6. *Yi liaoyin* 義了因 is the illuminating cause by means of *artha*, which again means both the message expressed and objects referred. This cause is the cause for the “illumination cause by awareness.”²⁵ *Yi liaoyin* 義了因 can also be understood as the

¹⁹ Elsewhere, the author explains this idea of *jicheng* 極成: “As will be shown in the remainder of this chapter, *yinming*, in contrast to *panjiao*, is a formalized method for certifying or falsifying a doctrinal proposition. It performs this task by taking what is accepted as recognized 極成能立 (Skt. *prasiddha sādhana*) through a process of inferential reasoning under a specific set of certified conditions to demonstrate successfully a proposition that is to be proved 所立 (Skt. *sādhya*) or rejected. A doctrinal proposition is regarded as justifiable because it satisfies the whole process of conditioned inferential reasoning or not justifiable because it violates some of these conditions.” (reference is omitted for the purpose of reviewing)

²⁰ 《因明大疏》：「由能立言成所立義，令彼智憶本成因喻故名了因。」T44, no. 1840, p. 101c21-23.

²¹ 《因明大疏》：「若爾既取智為了因，是言便失能成立義，此亦不然，令彼憶念本極成故。因喻舊許名本極成，由能立言成所立義，令彼智憶本成因喻，故名了因。」T44, no. 1840, p. 101c20-23.

²² 《因明大疏》：「謂立論主能立之言。」T44, no. 1840, p. 101c17.

²³ 《因明大疏》：「由此言故敵證二徒了解所立。」T44, no. 1840, p. 101c17-18.

²⁴ 《因明大疏》：「了因因故名為了因，非但由智了能照解，亦由言故。」T44, no. 1840, p. 101c18-19.

²⁵ 《因明大疏》：「義了因者，謂立論主能立言下所詮之義，為境能生他之智了，了因因故名為了因。」T44, no. 1840, p. 101c23-25.

meaning of the proofs 能立 (Skt. *sādhana*) that in turn establishes the proposition to be proved 所立 (Skt. *sādhya*), in a sense that it illuminates the proposition.²⁶

According to Kuiji, although in total there are six causes in the process of a logical argumentation, the most essential are the “generative cause by means of words *yan shengyin* 言生因 and the “illuminating cause by means of awareness” *zhi liaoyin* 智了因. Beginning with the words of the proponent, the correct understanding could arise eventually in the mind of the opponent: due to the “opponent’s awareness”, the concealed understanding is revealed.²⁷ In my view, this understanding of Kuiji illustrates an epistemology in the context of doctrinal arguments, showing how knowledge can be conveyed from the proponent to the opponent and, more importantly, how new understanding can be produced in the mind of the opponent by recalling the needed awareness that the opponent already possesses but remained somehow unrecognized before the argument. As should be clear here, the two crucial elements in this epistemological operation are the words along with their meanings, and the common awareness shared by both the proponent and the opponent.

The following figure should provide a more intuitive understanding of the causal relations between the “six causes”. I will use the same example to demonstrate these relations:


Sound is impermanent (proposition)

Because it is produced (inferential reason)

Just like a pot (example)

²⁶ 《因明大疏》：「亦由能立義，成自所立宗，照顯宗故亦名了因。」T44, no. 1840, p. 101c25-26.

²⁷ 《因明大疏》：「分別生了雖成六因，正意唯取言生智了。由言生故敵證解生，由智了故隱義今顯。」T44, no. 1840, pp. 101c28-102a1.



From this figure, we saw that the words 2 with its message 3 and the objects 3 to which they refer become illuminating causes words 4 & message 5, as far as the awareness 6 of the opponent is concerned. In other words, words 4 & message 5 do not generate any new awareness in the particular awareness 6 of the opponent at this stage, though they eventually do so at the final stage of realization. This means that for the final message, for example, “sound is impermanent”, to be understood and accepted by the opponent, the message that “sound is produced” and the logic that “whatever is produced is impermanent”, have to already constitute the content of the awareness 6 of the opponent. Without this shared awareness between awareness 1 of the proponent and the awareness 6 of the opponent, this whole process could not be finalized. With this epistemological principle, we will have better understanding why in the operation of Buddhist logic, or more precisely, inferential reasoning, the idea of “mutually accepted

共許”²⁸ or “acceptance as recognized 極成”²⁹ is a crucial precondition, which I will explain in brief as follows.

According to the Nyāyapraveśa, a proposition 宗 (Skt. pakṣa) of an inference is constituted by a subject, a property-possessor 有法 (Skt. dharmin), and the property 能別 (viśeṣaṇa) whose applicability to the subject the proponent desires to prove.³⁰ In order to demonstrate the intended proposition, the dharmin and the viśeṣaṇa must be accepted as recognized 極成 (Skt. prasiddha) by the opponent as well. This point is clearly recognized by Kuiji, who pointed out that “dharmin and viśeṣaṇa are only the “basis of the proposition” 宗依 but not the proposition itself 宗 (體). To prove the intended proposition, the two bases must be accepted as recognized by both parties 共許, because without bases the dependent could not be possibly established.”³¹ Here Kuiji made an important distinction between the basis of the proposition, what is to be proved 所立 (Skt. sādhya), and the proof 能立 (sādhana). While the sādhya is only intended by the proponent, the sādhana has to be accepted by both. Let me exemplify what is meant by “not accepted as recognized” in the following to see why this has to be the case.

²⁸ In Dignāga’s *Nyāyamukha*, this idea is known as “determined by both the proponent and the opponent” (*vādirativādiniścito*).

²⁹ This term given in the *Nyāyapraveśa* is “well-established” (*prasiddha*).

³⁰ 《因明入正理論》：「此中宗者，謂極成有法極成能別差別性故，隨自樂為所成立性，是名為宗。」T32, no. 1630, p. 11b3-4.
“*tatra pakṣaḥ prasiddho dharmī prasiddhaviśeṣaṇa-viśiṣṭatayā svayam sādhyatvenepsitaḥ*” (For Sanskrit origin, see N.D. Mironov, “Nyāyapraveśa I, Sanskrit text, edited and reconstructed,” *T’oung Pao* 28, 1931, p. 14) Kuiji pointed out that Xuanzang’s original translation for *viśeṣaṇa-viśiṣṭatayā* was 能別差別性故 (because of [its being qualified] by a qualifier), but Wengui 文軌, despite his lack of a solid grasp of Sanskrit, altered the translation to 能別差別為性 (by being qualified by a qualifier). Judging from the context, Wengui’s reading of the instrumental case is more appropriate than the ablative. Lü Cheng 呂澂 did not entirely agree with Kuiji’s reading, either (Cheng Lü, *Sheng ming lüeh* 聲明略, facsimile reproduction ed. Taipei: Kuang-wen shu-chü, 1977, p. 21). Tucci has a detailed comparative discussion these two constituents, namely, property-possessor 有法 (Skt. dharmin) and the property 能別 (viśeṣaṇa). (See Tucci, “Notes on the *Nyāya-praveśa* by Śankarasvāmin,” *Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society of Great Britain* 2, 1931, pp. 383-385.)

³¹ 《因明大疏》：「有法能別但是宗依，而非是宗，此依必須兩宗至極共許成就，為依義立，宗體方成。」T44, no. 1840, p. 98a16-17.

First, an example for the “non-accepted-as-recognized” property (*aprasiddhaviśeṣaṇa*) can be found in a scenario when Buddhists propose to the Sāṃkhyas that sound is perishable. Here, the target property (*viśeṣaṇa*), perishability, that the Buddhists intended to prove to occur in sound, is not accepted by the Sāṃkhyas as a recognized property. Now, this might appear odd, because the issue here is precisely the question whether sound is perishable or not. And if the Sāṃkhyas were to accept that the property occurs in the sound, there would not have been a debate in the first place. Some clarification is needed therefore. The question here is not whether the Sāṃkhyas accept that the property, perishability, occurs in sound or not. It focuses on the question of whether or not the Sāṃkhyas recognized such a property at all in general, which the Sāṃkhyas do not.³² Since the concept of “perish” is not recognized by the Sāṃkhyas, the question of whether sound is perishable or not becomes irrelevant and there is no point in pursuing the argument further.

Conclusion

The aforementioned discussion is found in Kuiji’s commentary to the *Nyāyapraveśa*, which is essentially a text on logic but not epistemology. However, the rules stipulated for an effective logical argumentation was connected to the principle of the six causes as explained in this article, and thus connected to epistemology. In conclusion, the study of medieval Chinese Buddhist logic, in my view, requires a deeper and a more comprehensive examination of the indigenous Buddhist commentaries. As shown in this paper, the medieval Chinese Buddhist monk scholars, based on Indian Buddhist logic literature, have developed a complex epistemology that, on the one hand, reflects the importance of Buddhist logic in illuminating Buddhist doctrine, and explains the mechanism of the epistemological

³² The concept of “things perishing” is not recognized in the Sāṃkhyas system, instead they speak of transformation (*prakṛti-pariṇāma*).

function not only on the linguistic level but also on the abstract conceptual level as well. This article certainly does not claim that Kuiji's interpretation and commentarial intent can be taken as representative of medieval Chinese scholars. Rather, this article is a vignette through which a larger and more nuanced picture of the intellectual significances of medieval "Chinese Buddhism scholasticism" can be conceived.³³

³³ For the definition of religious "scholasticism" and a pioneering comparative study of it, see Jose Cabezón's *Scholasticism: Cross-Cultural and Comparative Perspectives*, New York: Suny Press, 1998.

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窺基注疏中「六因」的知識論探討

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摘要：

一般而言，陳那在印度發展的佛教因明學的正式傳入中國，可說是起始於玄奘對商羯羅主所著《因明入正理論》*Nyāyapraveśa* 與陳那所著《因明正理門論》*Nyāyamukha* 的漢譯。佛教因明學者注意到玄奘並未翻譯陳那另一部更大部的巨著《集量論》*Pramāṇasamuccaya*，雖然玄奘提到此論。這個遺漏讓有些西方學者對漢傳佛教的佛教因明學的容受得出以下的結論：認為漢傳佛教對佛教因明的認識局限在邏輯形式與宗教意涵，而沒法發展出認識論。筆者認為這個結論頗有值得商榷之處。透過對玄奘弟子神泰、文軌，特別是窺基所闡述的「六因」理論的研究，筆者認為「六因」理論具有多層次而獨特的認識論意涵。同時透過這個研究，筆者也指出漢地本土所發展的佛教因明仍待更多的研究。

關鍵詞：

佛教因明、窺基、集量論、因明正理門論、認識論

